In a text written during his stay in Paris, Leibniz, to deny ontological reality to relations, employs an argument well known to the medieval thinkers and which later would be revived by Francis H. Bradley. If one assumes that relations are real and that a relation links any property to a subject – so runs the argument – then one falls prey to an infinite regress. Leibniz seems to be well aware of the consequences that this argument has for (...) his own metaphysical views, where the relation of inherence plays such a central role. Thus, he attempts first to interpret the relation of inherence as something ‘metaphoric’, originating from our ‘spatial way’ of looking at the surrounding world; and then he tries to reduce it to the part-whole relation which clearly he considers weaker, from the ontological point of view, than that of ‘being in’. (shrink)

Scotus’ natural theology has distinctive claims: (i) that we can reason demonstratively to the necessary existence and nature of God from what is actually so; but not from imagined situations, or from conceivability-to-us; rather, only from the possibility logically required for what we know actually to be so; (ii) that there is a univocal transcendental notion of being; (iii) that there are disjunctive transcendental notions that apply exclusively to everything, like ‘contingent/necessary,’ and such that the inferior cannot have a case (...) unless the superior does; (iv) that an a priori demonstration of the existence of God is impossible because there is nothing explanatorily prior to the divine being, and so, reasoning must be a posteriori, from the real dependences among things we perceive to the possibility of an absolutely First Being (The First Principle); (v) that such a being cannot be possible without existing necessarily; and (vi) that the First Being (God) is simple, omni-intelligent, free (spontaneous), omnipotent and, positively infinite;[1] and moreover, (vii) that there is a formal distinction, that is more than a distinction within our concepts or definitions, among the divine attributes. He makes that first point obvious throughout his several treatments, that one cannot reliably reason from conceptual consistency for us to the real and formal possibility or necessity of something; one must reason only to those necessities that are conditions of the possibility of what is known to be actual. The schema of the reasoning is, in a word, that “only the existence of God can make an effect even possible”[2]. Thus, it is explicitly incorrect to classify him along with St Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz, among those who reason a priori to the being of God[3]. He characteristically and deftly argues by indirect proof. He supposes the opposite of his intended conclusion and deduces a contradiction between that supposition and certain self-evident, or previously proved propositions, thus, getting his own conclusion by using the principle that whatever entails the denial of what is already known to be so, is false and its opposite is true,[4] “si negatur negatio, ponitur affirmatio.”[5] He also uses the argument form, “ if ‘p’ is not necessary, then ‘not-p’ is possible”.. (shrink)

Background: Little is known about U.S. healthcare provider views and practices regarding evidence, counseling, and shared decision-making about in-hospital versus out-of-hospital birth settings. Methods: We conducted 19 in-depth, semistructured, qualitative interviews of eight obstetricians, eight midwives, and three pediatricians from across the United States. Interviews explored healthcare providers’ interpretation of the current evidence and their personal and professional experiences with childbirth within the existing medical, ethical, and legal context in the United States. Results: Themes emerged concerning risks and benefits, decision-making, (...) and patient-provider power dynamics. Collectively, the narratives illuminated fundamental ideological tensions between in- and out-of-hospital providers arising from divergent assignment of value to described risks and benefits. The majority of physicians focused on U.S.-specific data demonstrating increased neonatal morbidity and mortality associated with delayed access to hospital-based interventions, thereby justifying hospital birth as the standard of care. By contrast, midwives emphasized data demonstrating fewer interventions and superior maternal and neonatal outcomes in high-income European countries, where out-of-hospital birth is more common for low-risk birthing people. A key gap in counseling was revealed, as no interviewees offered anticipatory counseling regarding birth setting options. Providers directly and indirectly illustrated the propensity for asymmetric power relations between birth providers and pregnant people, especially in hospital settings. Conclusions: The narratives highlight the common goal of optimizing maternal and neonatal outcomes despite tensions arising from divergent prioritization of specific maternal and neonatal risks. Our findings suggest opportunities to foster collaboration and optimize outcomes via mutual respect and improved integration of care. (shrink)

This compact booklet addresses informal logical aspects of infinite regress arguments. We know what infinite regress arguments are from such examples as Plato’s Third Man problem. It is presented here for tradition sake in its original formulation, where for convenience ‘man’ does duty for ‘human being’. Plato’s theory of abstract Ideas or Forms, in order to explain how it is that Phaedo and Meno are both men, posits their belonging to, participating in or falling under a higher ideal (...) abstract universal Man. The theory thereby takes the first irreversible step toward an infinite regress of ideal abstract universal men of increasingly higher order, beginning with the third MAN, for which there seems to be no legitimating explanatory rationale. A further example, to have several on hand, is the infinite regress that occurs on the assumption that every occurrent event has a temporally prior cause, or, simply, that every event has a cause that is also an event. The logical structure, class .. (shrink)

In an article published in Prolegomena 2006, Christoph Schmidt-Petri has defended his interpretation and attacked mine of Mill’s idea that higher kinds of pleasure are superior in quality to lower kinds, regardless of quantity. Millian qualitative superiorities as I understand them are infinite superiorities. In this paper, I clarify my interpretation and show how Schmidt-Petri has misrepresented it and ignored the obvious textual support for it. As a result, he fails to understand how genuine Millian qualitative (...) class='Hi'>superiorities determine the novel structure of Mill’s pluralistic utilitarianism, in which a social code of justice that distributes equal rights and duties takes absolute priority over competing considerations. Schmidt-Petri’s own interpretation is a non-starter, because it does noteven recognize that Mill is talking about different kinds of pleasant feelings, such that the higher kinds are intrinsically more valuable than the lower. I conclude by outlining why my interpretation is free of any metaphysical commitment to the “essence” of pleasure. (shrink)

Theories of superior collicular and hippocampal function have remarkable similarities. Both structures have been repeatedly implicated in spatial and attentional behaviour and in inhibitory control of locomotion. Moreover, they share certain electrophysiological properties in their single unit responses and in the synchronous appearance and disappearance of slow wave activity. Both are phylogenetically old and the colliculus projects strongly to brainstem nuclei instrumental in the generation of theta rhythm in the hippocampal EECOn the other hand, close inspection of behavioural and electrophysiological (...) data reveals disparities. In particular, hippocampal processing mainly concerns stimulus ambiguity, contextual significance, and spatial relations or other subtle, higher order characteristics. This requires the use of largely preprocessed sensory information and mediation of poststimulus investigation. Although collicular activity must also be integrated with that of “higher” centres, its primary role in attention is more “peripheral” and specific in controlling orienting/localisation via eye and body movements toward egocentrically labelled spatial positions. In addition, the colliculus may exert a nonspecific influence in alerting higher centres to the imminence of information potentially worthy of focal attention. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that collicular and hippocampal lesions produce deficits on similar tasks, although the type of deficit is usually different in each case. Functional overlap between hippocampus and colliculus is virtually certain vis-à-vis stimulus sampling, for example in the acquisition of information via vibrissal movements and visual scanning. In addition, insofar as stimulus significance is a factor in collicular orienting mechanisms, the hippocampus — cingulate – cortex — colliculus pathway may play a significant role, modulating collicular responsiveness and thus ensuring an attentional strategy appropriate to current requirements. A tentative “reciprocal loop” model is proposed which bridges physiological and behavioural levels of analysis and which would account for the observed degree and nature of functional overlap between the superior colliculus and hippocampus. (shrink)

Arrhenius and Rabinowicz have argued that Millian qualitative superiorities are possible without assuming that any pleasure, or type of pleasure, is infinitely superior to another. But AR's analysis is fatally flawed in the context of ethical hedonism, where the assumption in question is necessary and sufficient for Millian qualitative superiorities. Marginalist analysis of the sort pressed by AR continues to have a valid role to play within any plausible version of hedonism, provided the fundamental incoherence that infects AR's (...) use of such analysis is removed. But what AR call ‘Millian superiorities’ are never genuine qualitative superiorities in Mill's sense. Mill scholars need to appreciate this point and recognize that the interpretation of qualitative superiorities as infinite superiorities is the only interpretation which is compatible with the text of Mill's Utilitarianism. The continuing failure to appreciate the possibility of infinite superiorities has precluded any adequate understanding of the extraordinary structure of Mill's pluralistic hedonistic utilitarianism. (shrink)

I continue my argument that Millian qualitative superiorities are infinite superiorities: one pleasant feeling, or type of pleasant feeling, is qualitatively superior to another in Mill's sense if and only if even a bit of the superior is more pleasant (and thus more valuable) than any finite quantity of the inferior, however large. This gives rise to a hierarchy of higher and lower pleasures such that a reasonable hedonist always refuses to sacrifice a higher for a lower (...) irrespective of the finite amounts of each. Some indication of why this absolute refusal may be reasonable is provided in the course of outlining the content of the Millian hierarchy. It emerges that Mill's hedonistic utilitarianism has an extraordinary structure because it gives absolute priority over competing considerations to a code of justice that distributes equal rights and correlative duties for all. His utilitarianism also recognizes that certain aesthetic and spiritual pleasures may be qualitatively superior even to the pleasant feeling of security associated with the moral sentiment of justice. Thus, for instance, a noble individual may reasonably choose to waive his own rights so as to perform beautiful supererogatory actions that provide great benefits for others at the sacrifice of the right-holder's own vital interests. (shrink)

The topic of the ideal, that is, the topic of the possible or impossible human attainment of the absolute is ascribed divergent treatments throughout Kant’s work. Namely, it is either promptly accepted as possible by the critical Kant, and seen as something attainable by a means other than an infinite approximation (which would indeed imply a violation of autonomy, but denies the genuineness of the ideal), or it is rejected as impossible by the non-critical Kant, that is, it is (...) seen as something attainable only through an infinite approximation (which would involve an unconditional acceptance of heteronomy, but safeguards the authenticity of an aspiration to the ideal). Yet, the topic of the ideal receives a new, if not conciliatory, at least mutually explanatory approach in Kant’s Anthropology. Here – such is our proposition – Kant proposes a terminus medius between both conceptions of ideal, insofar as he is led to ponder on the mutual benefits of an autonomic possibility and an heteronomic impossibility of an infinite progression in thought; something which Kant proposes under the form of an almost-infinite, or an almost perennial, yet finite duration, to be endured until the attainment of an almost unreachable, yet indeed reachable practical ideal. A terminus medius which, we hope to prove, is none other than that at the root of Kant’s proposition of Pragmatic Anthropology as a mediating science in Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges, and which therefore may be ultimately seen as the embodiment of Kant’s anthropo-cosmological, or indeed cosmopolitical dimension of thought, as expressed in Kant’s political and/or historical writings. (shrink)

Population ethics studies the tradeoff between the total number of people who will ever live, and their quality of life. But widely accepted theories in modern cosmology say that spacetime is probably infinite. In this case, its population is also probably infinite, so the quantity/quality tradeoff of population ethics is no longer meaningful. Instead, we face the problem of how to ethically evaluate an infinite population of people dispersed throughout time and space. I argue that axiologies based (...) on _spatiotemporal Cesàro average utility_ are the most appropriate way to make this evaluation, because their unique properties make them superior to other axiologies that have been proposed. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTurkey hosts the world’s largest community of displaced Syrians. According to UNHCR, there are more than 3 million registered Syrians in Turkey as of 2018. Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria in 2011, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party has followed an open-door policy, which was accompanied by a discourse emphasizing religious solidarity and humanitarian values. However, the arrival of Syrian refugees has become entangled with the existing identity debates and conflicts in Turkish politics. The AKP’s discourse on (...) Syrian refugees has become intertwined with its positive self-representation as the defender of all oppressed people and its attempts to reconstruct the Turkish nation along more Islamic lines. The article analyses parliamentary debates and presidential speeches in order to unravel AKP discourses on Syrian refugees. Drawing upon the Discourse Historical Approach in Critical Discourse Analysis, the article puts forward two arguments. First, the refugee issue has become a constitutive component of AKP identity and a discursive tool to reconstruct the nation along more Islamic lines. Second, Turkey’s refugee policy has become a source of pride and enabled the AKP to claim moral superiority both vis-à-vis the West and its political opponents at home. (shrink)

Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, as represented by Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan and Tu Wei-ming, has a definite religiosity. They consciously draw a parallel between the Christian God-human relationship and Confucian Heaven-human relationship, and argue for the superiority of the latter. They characterize the Christian God as “pure transcendence”; in contrast, they embrace immanentism of the Heaven and assert the divinity of human nature. This article argues that these Confucian thinkers have a very distorted understanding of classical Christian theology. They cherry-pick some statements (...) from the Neo-Orthodox theologians, charge this God for its remoteness from us, and happily ascribe divinity to human nature. They are totally unaware that their immanentism is déjà vu to the Neo-Orthodox theological movement. The religious thoughts of Tang, Mou, and Tu, though in different degrees, resemble German liberal theology in many crucial ways, against which Barth, Brunner, and Bultmann have successfully revolted. Instead of using Neo-Orthodox theologians as a foil, the future development of Neo-Confucian religiousness has much to learn from this theological movement. (shrink)

This paper discusses the theoretical relationship between the views of Damascius and those of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. While Damascius’ De principiis is a bold treatise devoted to investigating the hypermetaphysics of apophatism, it anticipates various theoretical positions put forward by Dionysius the Areopagite. The present paper focuses on the following. First, Damascius is the only ancient philoso­pher who systematically demonstrates the first principle to be infinite. Second, Damascius modifies the concept and in several important passages shows the infinite (...) to be superior and prior to the finite. Third, Damascius’ theory of being is the strongest ancient articulation of the nature of the One which is a clear prefiguration of the negative theology developed by Dionysius the Areopagite. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics X.7, Aristotle argues that perfect happiness consists in contemplation alone. The question that I want to take up in this essay is whether the superiority of contemplative life fits with Aristotle’s argument for the self-sufficiency of the political life, according to which politics can lead us to happiness without being guided by philosophical knowledge of the highest sort. My basic argument is that, paradoxical as it may seem, Aristotle is led to acknowledge that contemplative life is superior (...) to political life by the same strand of argumentation which makes him plea for the self-sufficiency of the political life in the first place. In order to show how this argument unfolds, I take my point of departure from Aristotle’s analysis of phronēsis as stated in Nicomachean Ethics VI and bring it to bear on his discussion of the respective virtues of the contemplative and political ways of life in Politics VII. (shrink)

Language sciences have long maintained a close and supposedly necessary coupling between the infinite productivity of the human language faculty and recursive grammars. Because of the formal equivalence between recursion and non-recursive iteration; recursion, in the technical sense, is never a necessary component of a generative grammar. Contrary to some assertions this equivalence extends to both center-embedded relative clauses and hierarchical parse trees. Inspection of language usage suggests that recursive rule components in fact contribute very little, and likely nothing (...) significant, to linguistic creativity. Further than this, if the productivity of human language is considered as not rigidly bound, but not infinite, then the need for any sort of iteration in generative grammars vanishes and can be replaced with a Non-iterative Explicit Alternatives Rule grammar. The knock-on effects of dispensing with recursive grammar components are: that language diversity can simply be based on rule and lexicon combinatorics with no potentially infinite dimensions derived from recursive or iterative components of rules; the oddity of a vast, multiply-infinite competence set of ‘grammatical but unacceptable’ productions is gone; and the development of a language faculty based on rules that eschew iterative rule components avoids any need for explaining ‘special’ mechanisms. On the broader front of searching for the mechanisms of mind, our analysis can be similarly applied to the proposals for a recursive basis for mind as an explanation for humanity’s great leap forward. (shrink)

Although Alain Badiou dedicates a number of texts to the philosophy of Benedict de Spinoza throughout his work—after all, the author of a systematic philosophy of being more geometrico must be a point of reference for the philosopher who claims that “mathematics = ontology”—the reading offered in Meditation Ten of his key work Being and Event presents the most significant moment of this engagement. Here, Badiou proposes a reading of Spinoza’s ontology that foregrounds a concept that is as central to, (...) and celebrated in, his philosophy as it is strictly excluded by Spinoza: the void. In nuce, Badiou contends that for all of Spinoza’s efforts to offer an ontology of total plenitude, the void returns in his philosophy under the (at first sight) unlikely name of infinite mode. The presence of this errant name in Spinoza’s philosophy bears witness to the failure of his most profound intellectual endeavour. However striking Badiou’s reading of Spinoza, this paper argues that it fails to adequately grasp Spinoza’s metaphysics, particularly with respect to the central concept of modal essence, a concept which does not appear at all in the Badiouian text. By introducing a consideration of this concept, it becomes able to resolve the status of infinite modes, and to account for the move across the notorious finite–infinite divide. Thus the argument turns to the reading of Spinoza offered by Gilles Deleuze for a more thorough-going and nuanced approach, much superior to Badiou’s procrustean critique. (shrink)

In seeking to found a ‘new political logic’, Badiou argues that we can only retrieve the political sense of concrete negation through its subordination to a prior field of affirmation: i.e. the opening of a new possibility inside a given historical situation, or ‘the event’, that may be politically realised through the creation of a ‘new subjective body’ consisting in the social affirmation of those new possibilities. Revolutionary politics is therefore said to rest on a synthesis of, on the one (...) hand, democracy in the sense of spontaneous mass-political irruption, and, on the other, a prescriptive elaboration of the ramifications of the event. The discussion then turns to the question of strategy – outside and against the politically moribund State-form – and his reconfiguration of political universality vis-à-vis the formulations of classical Marxism. Badiou counterposes capitalist ideology’s implicit anthropology of self-interested animals to his own of subjects embodied in a generic truth-procedure and its concomitant model of political rights, where what is ultimately at stake is ‘the complete transformation of the form of... difference, of the way the difference exists’ rather than a materialist dialectics of antagonistic contradiction. The interview concludes with Badiou clarifying his relationship to Lacanian psychoanalysis as an essential but by no means exhaustive conceptual armoury for understanding the relation between subject and event. (shrink)

The absolutist status Mill assigns to his liberty principle (LP) is incompatible with standard utilitarian maximizing reasoning. But LP is compatible with his non-standard utilitarianism, whose extraordinary structure is clarified using a “consequentializing” lens. This involves enlarging outcomes to include not only the downstream consequences of self-regarding actions but also the actions themselves and the agent’s liberty of choosing them using his own agent-relative evaluation criteria. Self-regarding liberty is protected by indefeasible moral right and, according to the higher pleasures doctrine, (...) the moral sentiment of justice has a pleasant quality that is infinitely superior in value as pleasure to any conflicting kinds of pleasure. Infinitesimal value attaches to any pleasures enjoyed by those who wrongfully interfere to compel competent but foolish or reckless agents to take self-regarding actions with the most expedient consequences. Absolute weight is thereby consistently given to LP over all competing considerations in the course of maximizing general happiness in point of quantity and quality. (shrink)

The “detection” of God by humans is based on the supernatural nature of human reasoning in which the inferior supernatural being “detects” the infinitely superior supernatural Being. Purely physical devices cannot accomplish that.

Sentences such as "The author started the book" are indeterminate because they do not make explicit what the subject (the author) started doing with the object (the book). In principle, indeterminate sentences allow for an infinite number of interpretations. One theory, however, assumes that these sentences are resolved by semantic coercion, a linguistic process that forces the noun "book" to be interpreted as an activity (e.g., writing the book) or by a process that interpolates this activity information in the (...) resulting enriched semantic composition. An alternative theory, pragmatic, assumes classical semantic composition, whereby meaning arises from the denotation of words and how they are combined syntactically, with enrichment obtained via pragmatic inferences beyond linguistic-semantic processes. Cognitive neuroscience studies investigating the neuroanatomical and functional correlates of indeterminate sentences have shown activations either at the ventromedial pre-frontal cortex or at the left inferior frontal gyrus. These studies have supported the semantic coercion theory assuming that one of these regions is where enriched semantic composition takes place. Employing fMRI, we found that indeterminate sentences activate bilaterally the superior temporal gyrus, the right inferior frontal gyrus, and the anterior cingulate cortex, more so than control sentences ("The author wrote the book"). Activation of indeterminate sentences exceeded that of anomalous sentences ("…drank the book") and engaged more left- and right-hemisphere areas than other sentence types. We suggest that the widespread activations for indeterminate sentences represent the deployment of pragmatic-inferential processes, which seek to enrich sentence content without necessarily resorting to semantic coercion. (shrink)

Esta reflexão pretende mostrar o discurso racional cartesiano na segunda prova da existência de Deus. Para tanto, Descartes se depara com uma pergunta central: qual a causa da existência da res cogitans que é finita e possui a ideia de infinito? A resposta é encontrada na desproporcionalidade ontológica entre o finito e o infinito. Essa desproporcionalidade é elucidada mediante dois conceitos: o princípio de causalidade que determina que a causa deve ser igual ou superior a coisa causada e o princípio (...) de criação contínua em que a causa que criou o ser não é menor do que aquela que o conserva em sua existência. As objeções destacadas no texto contra os argumentos cartesianos foram escolhas deliberadas que servem para elucidar a importância da racionalidade como fundamento para a prova da existência de Deus. A relação entre o entendimento e a liberdade, apresentada no texto sucintamente, justifica a impossibilidade da res cogitans ser causa de si mesma. Palavras-chave: Infinito; finito; causalidade; criação contínuaThis essay aims to show the rational Cartesian discourse on the second proof of God’s existence. In order to do so, Descartes faces a core question: which is the cause for the existence of the res cogitans that is finite in front of the idea of the infinite? The answer is found in the ontological disproportionality between the finite and the infinite. This disproportionality is elucidated through a couple crucial concepts: the principle of causality, which determines that the cause must be equal or superior to the caused thing and the principle of continuous creation, in which the cause that created the being is not inferior than the one that preserves its existence. The objections highlighted in the text against the Cartesian arguments were deliberated choices, to elucidate the relevance of rationality as the foundation for the proof of God’s existence. The relation between the understanding and the liberty, showed on the text even if succinctly, justifies the impossibility of the res cogitans to be the cause of itself. Key words: Infinite; finite; causality; creation continuous. (shrink)

In the individual, social, and political dimensions, the shaping of the liberal tradition has met up with and will continue to meet up with the presence of the Roman Catholic Church with its own philosophy. Yet has this always led to sharp conflict between Catholicism and liberalism? Has the social thinking of the Church evolved in its assessment of the liberal tradition and vice versa? Have there been points in common in the two systems of thinking? In contrast, where have (...) sparks appeared? Does Catholicism support the stability of liberal democracy? A response to these questions comprises the primary aim of the work at hand. Herein is a presentation and appraisal of one of the most interesting and continually lively clashes, accompanied by a portrayal of both Catholicism and liberalism. Analysis will be conducted at the level of social philosophy, through incidental political practice, and from the historical perspective – all of which together will enable illustration of the dynamic relationship between Catholicism and liberalism. Due to the scope of liberalism, the analysis of the Catholicism-liberalism relationship will be limited solely to the philosophy of politics and of economics. Such a restricted social philosophy involves the following issues: the genesis, essence, and characteristics of social policy; its ultimate justification or lack thereof; the relationship between the political society and its members; the types of structured political communities; the genesis, nature and duties of political authorities; the definition of the law, its foundations and limitations; the essence and properties of economic life; types of ownership; and, finally, the relations taking place between politics and economics. The problem inherent in an encounter between the social thinking of the Roman Catholic Church and liberalism appear to be especially meaningful in the context of the Polish discourse regarding the new order, its theoretical bases and institutions, projects for the realization of individual freedom, and the superiority or inferiority of values in today’s pluralistic universe. This matter is of great consequence and significance – not only intellectually but above all practically – and manifests itself in political, economic, and cultural life. Nonetheless, for decades now, Polish research into this issue has been entangled in occasional conflicts of a worldview and political nature. In turn, there is a lack of understanding and objective theoretical reflection on the subject. In fact, there are no publications which attempt to understand liberalism and assess the validity of the accusations against it. The vast amount of literature devoted to this problem most frequently opens, right from the start, with arguments stemming from either a Marxist or Catholic apologetics. The liberal credo is not identified with the philosophy of politics, but rather the theory of pro-capitalist economics. This, as a result, not only misrepresents the crux of liberalism, but also narrows the catalogue of responses by the Church on this very topic – starting with the encyclical Rerum novarum (1891) by Pope Leo XIII. In order to resolve this problem, the analysis will be rooted in the broader philosophical and historical context. In other words, it will look into liberalism on the one hand, and into those Church documents in which that institution first spoke of liberalism on the other. The discussions and deliberations contained within this volume are laid out in an introduction, four chapters, and a conclusion. The introduction includes the theoretical bases and methodological assumptions of this work, taking into account the principles of philosophical reflection and analysis. The fundamental chapters present the evolution of an attitude towards liberalism in the social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church – from Pius VI to John Paul II – taking under consideration the key moments and figures in the development of liberalism (e.g., John Locke, John Stuart Mills, John Rawls). In this time period four stages of a Catholic reference to liberalism will be distinguished. The first three constitute: 1) animosity and condemnation (from Pius VI to Pius IX), 2) criticism accompanied by tolerance (from Leo XIII to Pius XII, and 3) criticism accompanied by limited concord (from John XXIII to Paul VI). Today, and with increasing frequency, voices are heard speaking of the teachings of John Paul II as marking a new caesura in the Catholic-liberalism relationship. Hence it is worth re-evaluating and re-analyzing if such opinions are justified. The volume closes with a conclusion comprising an attempt to answer the following questions. Are Catholic accusations addressed at liberalism correct or not? Has liberalism turned out to be a philosophy open to criticism and capable of modification as the weak points in liberal theory and practice are disclosed? Can Catholic values enrich the liberal political order? Can Catholic moral-religious norms, introduced into the realm of political responsibilities, endanger the foundations of the liberal system? Reviewing the evolution of Catholicism as well as liberalism, has Catholicism found its place amidst the pluralistic harmony of liberal democracy? Kształtowanie się tradycji liberalnej napotykało i będzie napotykać na promowaną przez Kościół rzymskokatolicki filozofię, zarówno w wymiarze indywidualnym, społecznym, jak i politycznym. Czy zawsze prowadziło to do ostrego sporu między katolicyzmem a liberalizmem? Czy społeczna myśl Kościoła ewoluowała w swojej ocenie tradycji liberalnej i vice versa? Czy w obu systemach myślowych istniały punkty wspólne? Czego dotyczyły ogniska zapalne? Czy katolicyzm wspiera stabilność liberalnej demokracji? Te pytania sprawiły, że głównym celem niniejszej pracy jest prezentacja i ocena jednego z najbardziej interesujących i wciąż aktualnych sporów, a pośrednio przedstawienie dwóch filozofii – katolicyzmu i liberalizmu. Analiza tego sporu prowadzona jest na płaszczyźnie filozofii społecznej, incydentalnie – praktyki politycznej w ujęciu historycznym, co umożliwia ukazanie dynamiki relacji między katolicyzmem i liberalizmem. Z powodu zakresu liberalizmu w analizie relacji katolicyzm – liberalizm praca ta ogranicza się jedynie do filozofii polityki i filozofii gospodarki. Tak okrojona filozofia społeczna interesuje się następującymi problemami: genezą, istotą i cechami społeczności politycznej, jej ostatecznym uzasadnieniem lub brakiem takowego oraz relacjami między społeczeństwem politycznym a jego członkami, typami ustrukturyzowania wspólnoty politycznej, genezą, naturą i zadaniami władzy politycznej, definicją prawa, jego podstawą i ograniczeniami, istotą i właściwościami życia gospodarczego, rodzajami własności, stosunkami zachodzącymi między polityką a ekonomią. Problem spotkania myśli społecznej Kościoła katolickiego z liberalizmem wydaje się szczególnie znaczący również w kontekście polskich dyskusji o tworzącym się ładzie, jego teoretycznych podstawach i instytucjach, projekcie realizacji indywidualnej wolności oraz wyższości i niższości wartości w dzisiejszym, pluralistycznym uniwersum. Problem ten ma olbrzymie znaczenie nie tylko intelektualne, ale przede wszystkim praktyczne, objawiające się na poziomie życia politycznego, ekonomicznego i kulturowego. Jednak od wielu dziesięcioleci polskie studia nad tym zagadnieniem są uwikłane w doraźne konflikty o charakterze światopoglądowym i politycznym, natomiast brakuje rozumiejącej i obiektywnej refleksji teoretycznej na ten temat. Właściwie nie ma publikacji próbujących zrozumieć liberalizm i ocenić zasadność stawianych mu zarzutów. Ogrom literatury poświęcony temu problemowi najczęściej zawiera prace już na wstępie wychodzące z pozycji apologetycznie marksistowskich czy katolickich. Utożsamia się w nich credo liberalizmu nie z filozofią polityki, lecz z teorią ekonomii prokapitalistycznej, co nie tylko zakłamuje istotę liberalizmu, lecz także zawęża katalog wypowiedzi Kościoła na jego temat, rozpoczynając je od encykliki Rerum novarum (1891) Leona XIII. Aby sprawę wyjaśnić w niniejszej książce, analiza jest umieszczona w szerszym kontekście filozoficznym i historycznym, czyli „ma wgląd”, z jednej strony w liberalizm, z drugiej – w dokumenty Kościoła, w których on po raz pierwszy zabrał głos w sprawie liberalizmu. Rozważania zawarte w niniejszej pracy podzielone są na wstęp, cztery rozdziały i zakończenie. We wstępie prezentuję podłoże teoretyczne i założenia metodologiczne rozprawy, przestrzegając zasad refleksji i analizy filozoficznej. Rozdziały przedstawiają ewolucję stosunku do liberalizmu w społecznej nauce Kościoła rzymskokatolickiego, od czasów Piusa VI do Jana Pawła II, z uwzględnieniem ważniejszych momentów rozwoju myśli liberalnej (John Locke, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls). W omawianym okresie wyróżniam cztery etapy katolickiego odniesienia do liberalizmu: pierwszy – wrogości i potępienia (od Piusa VI do Piusa IX), drugi – krytyki, ale zarazem tolerowania (od Leona XIII do Piusa XII), trzeci – krytyki, choć i ograniczonej zgody (od Jan XXIII do Pawła VI) i czwarty – powszechnie oceniany jako przełom w katolickiej percepcji liberalizmu (pontyfikat Jana Pawła II). Całość rozważań zamknie zakończenie, którego treścią jest próba odpowiedzi na pytania: czy katolickie zarzuty pod adresem liberalizmu są trafne czy też nie? Czy liberalizm okazał się filozofią otwartą na krytykę, zdolną do modyfikacji pod wpływem ujawniania słabych stron teorii lub praktyk liberalnych? Czy wartości katolickie mogą wzbogacić liberalny porządek polityczny? Czy też katolickie normy moralno-religijne, wprowadzone w obręb obowiązków politycznych, zagrażają fundamentom ustroju liberalnego? Czy zarówno wobec ewolucji katolicyzmu, jak i liberalizmu katolicyzm odnalazł się w pluralistycznej harmonii liberalnej demokracji? (shrink)

divisibility in Physics VI. I had been assuming at that time that Aristotle's elimination of reference to the infinitely large in his account of the potential inf inite--like the elimination of the infinitely small from nineteenth century accounts of limits and continuity--gave us everything that was important in a theory of the infinite. Hilbert's paper showed me that this was not obviously so. Suddenly other certainties about Aristotle's (apparently) judicious toning down of (supposed) Platonic extremisms began to crumble. The (...) upshot of work I had been doing earlier on Plato's 'Third Man Argument' began to look different from the way it had before. I was confronted with a possibility I had not till then so much as entertained. What if the more extreme posi tions of Plato on these issues were the more likely to be correct? The present work is the first instalment of the result ing reassessment of Plato's metaphysics, and especially of his theory of Forms. It has occupied much of my teaching and scholarly time over the past fifteen years and more. The central question wi th which I concern myself is, "How does Plato argue for the existence of his Forms (if he does )7" The idea of making this the central question is that if we know how he argues for the existence of Forms, we may get a better sense of what they are. (shrink)

En Política VI 2, 1317b 1-17, Aristóteles define así la democracia: «el rasgo esencial de la democracia es el vivir como se quiere sin ninguna interferencia y de aquí vino el de no ser gobernado, si es posible por nadie, y si no, por turnos. Esta característica contribuye a un sistema general de la libertad fundada en la igualdad». Este modelo normativo dio lugar, históricamente, a dos posibles regímenes políticos, la democracia popular o extrema, basada en la participación directa de (...) todos los ciudadanos, como en Atenas, y una «constitución mixta» que tenía rasgos tanto democráticos como oligárquicos, llamada república en la tradición romana desde Cicerón. La democracia moderna es la heredera de ambos regímenes, moderada por la nueva concepción de los derechos individuales que son propios del pensamiento moderno desde Hugo Grotius hasta la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos. La constitución representativa fue, así, la solución moderna al conflicto entre gobierno de la mayoría y gobierno de las leyes. Desde su Independencia en el siglo XIX, las democracias de América Latina sufren por la tensión no resuelta entre populismo y constitución liberal democrática. El neo-populismo que surgió en los últimos años del siglo XX se presentó como un desafío y una respuesta a las promesas incumplidas de la democracia. Contra los defensores del populismo autoritario, como por ejemplo Ch. Mouffe y E. Laclau, yo sostengo que la democracia deliberativa es una respuesta superior a esas promesas. (shrink)

In Republic VI 508e-9b Plato has Socrates claim that the Good is the cause (αίτίαν) of truth and knowledge as well as the very being of the Forms. Consequently, as causes must be distinct from and superior to their effects, the Good is neither truth nor knowledge nor even being, but exceeds them all in beauty (509a), as well as in honour and power (509b). No other passage in Plato has had a more intoxicating effect on its readers. To take (...) just one example, James Adam was moved to quote St. Paul when he remarked about this passage that, 'it is highly characteristic of Plato's whole attitude that he finds the true keystone of the Universe — the ultimate fountain from which both Knowledge and Existence flow — in no cold and colourless ontological abstraction, like Being, but in that for which "all creation groans and labours". (shrink)

In spite of its infinite expectation value, the St. Petersburg game is not only a gamble without supply in the real world, but also one without demand at apparently very reasonable asking prices. We offer a rationalizing explanation of why the St. Petersburg bargain is unattractive on both sides (to both house and player) in the mid-range of prices (finite but upwards of about $4). Our analysis – featuring (1) the already-established fact that the average of finite ensembles of (...) the St. Petersburg game grows with ensemble size but is unbounded, and (2) our own simulation data showing that the debt-to-entry fee ratio rises exponentially – explains why both house and player are quite rational in abstaining from the St. Petersburg game. The house will be unavoidably (and intentionally) exposed to very large ensembles (with very high averages, and so very costly to them), while contrariwise even the well-heeled player is not sufficiently capitalized (as our simulation data reveals) to be able to capture the potential gains from large-ensemble play. (Smaller ensembles, meanwhile, enjoy low means, as others have shown, and so are not worth paying more than $4 to play, even if a merchant were to offer them at such low prices per trial.) Both sides are consequently rational in abstaining from entry into the St. Petersburg market in the mid-range of asking prices. We utilize the concept of capitalization vis-à-vis a gamble to make this case. Classical analyses of this question have paid insufficient attention to the question of the propriety of using expected values to assess the St. Petersburg gamble. And extant analyses have not noted the average-maximum-debt-before-breaking-even figures, and so are incomplete. (shrink)

Definitions Axioms Prop. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications Prop. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common Prop III. Things, which have nothing in common, cannot be one the cause of the other Prop. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attributes of the substance, or by the differences of their modifications Prop. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more (...) substances having the same nature or attribute Prop. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance Prop. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substance Prop. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite Prop. IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the number of its attributes Prop. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself Prop. XI. God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists Prop. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived, from which it would follow that substance can be divided Prop. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible Prop. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived Prop. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived Prop. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways--that is, all things which fall within the sphere of infinite intellect Prop. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature and is not constrained by anyone Prop. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things Prop. XIX. God and all the attributes of God are eternal Prop. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the same Prop. XXI. All things, which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, must always exist and be infinite, or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute Prop.. (shrink)

Plotinus’s theory of dual selfhood has ethical norms built into it, all of which derive from the ontological superiority of the higher (or undescended) soul in us overthe body-soul compound. The moral life, as it is presented in the Enneads, is a life of self-perfection, devoted to the care of the higher self. Such a conception of morality is prone to strike modern readers as either ‘egoistic’ or unduly austere. If there is no doubt that Plotinus’s ethics is exceptionally austere, (...) it will be argued below that it is not ‘egoistic.’ To that effect, the following questions will be addressed: Are the virtues, civic as well as purificatory, mere means to Plotinus’s metaphysically conceived ethical goal? To what extent must the lower self abnegate itself so as to enable the higher self to ascend to Intellect and beyond? And if self-perfection lies at the centre of the Plotinian moral life, is there any conceptual room left in it for other-regarding norms of conduct? A close reading of selected passages from Plotinus’s tractate I.2[19] On Virtues and tractate VI.8[39] On Free Will and the Will of the One will, it is claimed, bring elements of answer to these questions. (shrink)

First-order formalisations are often preferred to propositional ones because they are thought to underwrite the validity of more arguments. We compare and contrast the ability of some well-known logics—these two in particular—to formally capture valid and invalid arguments. We show that there is a precise and important sense in which first-order logic does not improve on propositional logic in this respect. We also prove some generalisations and related results of philosophical interest. The rest of the article investigates the results’ philosophical (...) significance. A first moral is that the correct way to state the oft-cited superiority of first-order logic vis-`a-vis propositional logic is more nuanced than often thought. The second moral concerns semantic theory; the third logic’s use as a tool for discovery. A fourth and final moral is that second-order logic’s transcendence of first-order logic is greater than first-order logic’s transcendence of propositional logic. (shrink)

The article analyzes section VI B («The Spirit in Self-Estrangement») within absolute knowing. The main focus is Hegel’s speculative analysis of the formal structure of absolute knowing, starting from infinite judgement («the thing is ego»), to its conclusion with the definition of utility as preisgegebnes Sein für anderes (a being at the mercy of an «other», in Baillie’s translation). The article does not examine the phenomenological process of culture development, but focuses on the formal structure of pure insight (the (...) most important result of culture), comparing the self which constitutes the insight with the one which manifests itself as self-knowing spirit in absolute knowing. Here the inexorable Aufhebung of insight, as purest incarnation of modern reason, comes to light: Hegel emphasizes rationality and therefore he criticizes its abstract form which downgrades pure insight from reason to raisonnements of Understanding. (shrink)

These chapters analyze texts from Isaac Newton’s work to shed new light on scientific understanding at his time. Newton used the concept of “sensorium” in writings intended for a public audience, in relation to both humans and God, but even today there is no consensus about the meaning of his term. The literal definition of the Latin term 'sensorium', or its English equivalent 'sensory', is 'thing that feels’ but this is a theoretical construct. The book takes readers on a process (...) of discovery, through inquiry into both Newton’s concept and its underlying model. It begins with the human sensorium. This part of his concept is situated in the context of the aforesaid writings but also in the context of the writings of two of Newton's contemporaries, the physicians William Briggs and Thomas Willis, both of whom were at the forefront of their respective specialties of ophthalmology and neurology. Only once the human sensorium has been explored is it possible to generalize to the unobservable divine sensorium, because Newton's method of reasoning from experience requires that the second part of his concept is last in the order of knowledge. And the reason for this sequence is that his method, the short-hand term for which is 'analogy of nature', proceeds from that which has been observed to be universally true to that which is beyond the limits of observation. Consequently, generalization passes insensibly into reasoning by analogy. Readers will see how certain widespread assumptions can be called into question, such as that Newton was a theological voluntarist for whom the will is superior to the intellect, or that, for Newton, not only the world or universe but also God occupies the whole extent of infinite space. The insights afforded through this book will appeal to scholars of the philosophy of science, human physiology, philosophy of mind and epistemology, among others. (shrink)

Most economists believe capitalism is a compromise with selfish human nature. As Adam Smith put it, "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." Capitalism works better than socialism, according to this thinking, only because we are not kind and generous enough to make socialism work. If we were saints, we would be socialists. In Why Not Capitalism ?, Jason Brennan attacks (...) this widely held belief, arguing that capitalism would remain the best system even if we were morally perfect. Even in an ideal world, private property and free markets would be the best way to promote mutual cooperation, social justice, harmony, and prosperity. Socialists seek to capture the moral high ground by showing that ideal socialism is morally superior to realistic capitalism. But, Brennan responds, ideal capitalism is superior to ideal socialism, and so capitalism beats socialism at every level. Clearly, engagingly, and at times provocatively written, Why Not Capitalism? will cause readers of all political persuasions to re-evaluate where they stand vis-à-vis economic priorities and systems—as they exist now and as they might be improved in the future. (shrink)

In the development of modern philosophy self-consciousness was not generally or unanimously given important consideration. This was because philosophers such as Descartes, Kant and Fichte thought it served as the highest principle from which we can 'deduce' all propositions that rightly claimed validity. However, the Romantics thought that the consideration of self-consciousness was of the highest importance even when any claim to foundationalism was abandoned. In this respect, Hölderlin and his circle, as well as Novalis and Schleiermacher, thought that self-consciousness, (...) itself, was not a principle but must be ranked on a minor or dependent level, and presupposed the Absolute as a superior but inaccessible condition or ground. This reservation did not hinder them from recognising that the foundationalist Fichte was the first to have shown conclusively that from Descartes, via German Rationalism and British Empiricism, up to Kant, self-consciousness was misconceived of as the result of an act of reflection by which a second-order act bent back upon a first-order act that is identical to itself. This conception entailed circular entanglements and infinite regresses, and was too high a price to pay. Whereas Fichte thought pre-reflexive self-awareness was a philosophical principle, the Romantics and their vehement critic Kierkegaard, abandoned the idea of self-consciousness as a foundational starting point of philosophy. Instead, they founded self-consciousness on transcendent Being, a prior non-conceptual consciousness ('feeling') and reproached Fichte for having fallen back into the repudiated reflection model of self-consciousness. (shrink)

Nikolaus von Kues ist eine der faszinierendsten Persönlichkeiten im Übergang vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit. Während seine theologischen und neuplatonischen Vorstellungen viel beachtet werden, gilt das weniger für seine naturphilosophischen Ideen: Wie Gott die Welt in Wirklichkeit, so schafft der Mensch sie in Gedanken. Beobachtung, Experiment und Mathematik sind zum Verständnis der Natur notwendig. Die biblische Überlieferung ist nicht wörtlich zu nehmen. Er propagierte ein fast unendliches Universum ohne Mittelpunkt und Begrenzung mit einer sich bewegenden Erde. Besonders bedeutsam im Hinblick auf (...) Reichweite und Grenzen moderner Naturwissenschaft ist seine Theorie des "Wissens vom Nichtwissen": Wissenschaft selbst ist geeignet, ihre eigenen Grenzen zu erkennen. Die Schrift würdigt auch die Persönlichkeit des Cusanus und schließt mit einem Essay über die Beziehung von Naturwissenschaft und Religion in unserer Zeit. The booklet is a re-edition of sections on Nicolas de Cusa in my book "Die gedachte Natur" (1991), also in philpapers. Cusanus was of one of the most original philosophers of the early Renaissance. He gave reasons for human self-confidence: as God created the world order in reality, man creates it in his mind. Not only mathematics, but also quantitative experiments, are essential for understanding nature. Human rationality is superior to verbal interpretations of the Bible: the universe is almost infinite, with no limits and no centre, and with a moving earth. And he insisted on what he considered to be the highest form of knowledge: the knowledge of the limits of knowledge, with far-reaching implications for the philosophy of nature and human cognition. (shrink)

The emphasis that the modernity gives to disengagement and beginning leads one to think that the modernity itself is in fact a culture that initiares crisis. Even if there is no initial crisis, it can be created through the ambivalent nature of modernity. Behind the concept of crisis lies the notion that history is a continuous process or movement that opens the door to nihilistic understanding which stems from the idea of contemporary life and thought alienation through the pessimistic meaning (...) of the word. There is a dialectical relationship between the ideas of modernity and progress, and the decadence, and the main theme of Nietzsche's philosophical career. Since the death of Hegel, who made the idea of crisis plausible, everything is nothing but a counter-movement not only in Germany, but also in Europe. The first of these counter-movements is romanticism with its objection to the mind which is liberated from the bonds of tradition. The main thesis of the present article is, between reactiveness of romanticism -on the surface- and the modernity; from one side romanticism's consuming modernity, which is its mirror image, while at the same time feeding from it and modernity's manipulating the ideas developed against it and monopolizing them thanks to its ambivalent nature. For this purpose, following an an anti-enlightenment thinker Nietzsche's, anti-romantic footsteps which at the same time feeds from the romantic heritage, an attempt will be made to analyze the relationship between modernity and romanticism. Another goal of this article is to allow a comparison of how the intellectual development in the West finds its response on the modernization process of our country by probing how the modernization experience of early period Islamist's who experienced this process in a feeling of "backwardness" and with a wounded consciousness and anxiety has led to a shallow romantic worldview. SummaryRomance and romanticism are the main topics of this article. Romanticism is a period, whereas romance is a spiritual attitude not limited to this period, therefore, even today it’s existence is felt. In other words, it is not specific to the Germans. This term is often used to correspond to certain aspects of European intellectual life in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, for instance between 1790 and 1850. In its extremely diverse definitions, the most "romantic" definition in our opinion, belongs to Novalis: “I'm romanticizing by giving a high meaning to ordinary things, a mysterious reputation to the ordinary, the honor of the unknown to the known, an infinite look to the finite.” The rejection of existing social reality, the experience of loss, the melancholic longing and the search for loss are the main components of the romantic motive. This study is based on the argument that there is a dialectical relation between romanticism and modernity, which is known as an opposing movement against enlightenment thought. The intellectual feature, which contains the opposite of modernity itself, makes this argument plausible. In addition, the view of modernity as a crisis culture due to the emphasis on disengament and beginnings offers us the possibility to establish a relationship between modernity, which accepts itself as decadence, and romance. Behind the concept of crisis lies the idea that history is a continuous process or movement opening the door to the nihilist understanding in which modern life and thought are alienated in a pessimistic sense. Thus, Allan Megill defines historicism as a prerequisite for nihilism. According to the author, Prophets of Extremity, if the history has no direction to be changed, maintained or lost when wandering in history, it also cannot have a "crisis". The suggestion of "God is dead" is the most concise expression of this crisis. In this crisis state of nihilism, it is a completely forlorn condition of living in the present. Today, which is in the absolute forlorn state; the savior declares his belief that he is devoid of all sorts of features, things that let us reconcile with the current situation of things. In the face of this situation, when people see that the present becomes completely forlorn, they move in two opposite directions with a desire to regenerate culturally: They either have to go back to the past or head for the future. However, every attempt to determine what the future or the past posess will require them to be real, belonging to the present. This will return us to the forlorn state. Nietzsche embraces both opposing sides, but does not attempts choose between them. This is the place where Nietzsche dictates that today is corrupt taking a radical attitude against romanticism fed by the notion of crisis. The fact that modernity has given up its critique of reason, which is revealed by its dialectic, had a great influence on Nietzsche's putting distance between himself and romantics. That is to say, in response to enlightened thought, although romantics speak of unity, apparently, they could not prevent emergence of emotion against mind, local against the universal, individual against social, in other words, the emergence of the second values, which they believed that these were belittled and despised by Enlightenment. Therefore, romantics seem like they could not save themselves from being caught in the web of dialectics in the account they entered that is based on the subject-object distinction in cartesian thought. It is because modernity acts with the consciousness that the life is established on the occurrence and decadence. Based on this, we can say that decadence is inevitable. This decadence (distortion) from the outside may be through movements developed against it, or experienced within itself (even if no one attempts to destroy it). Modernity, with the awareness that it cannot escape from the decadence, wants to arbitrate itself by turning this decadence in its favor by manipulating it. In other words, the modernity dramatizes the feeling of crisis considering itself decadence and the seemingly contradictory ideas of avant-garde and decadence become almost synonymous. It must be the reason why Nietzsche identifies modernity with decadence Modernity manages to put the decadence in its body at the center of attraction by producing self-opposing movements, monopolizing and manipulating. In short, both romanticism and avant-garde movements are the movements that are emerged not against modernity but from itself. Just like an apple worm, they both consume modernity and feed on it. They act as a mirror. Although they seem to criticize, as movements that have emerged from it, they allow the modernity to complete and correct the deficiencies. As a result of this, we can say that romantic critical movements are developed against the world and are shaped by modernity, beginning with the idea of enlightenment, and moved forward in the track of modernity.While romanticism developed in the West as opposed to modernity, in Ottoman-Turkish thought, it was seen as the rhetoric of retardation and regretting of backwardness from civilization. It is inevitable that the experience of modernization in a sense of backwardness, with a wounded consciousness and urgency, will open up space for romance. In our modernization adventure starting with Tanzimat, it is a fact that there has not been a drastic reckoning due to Enlightenment on an intellectual basis, industrialization on an economic basis, programs of revolutionary and nationalist formations on a political basis. Therefore, in Turkish thought, it is not possible to talk about a critical tradition developed against modern paradigm. The status of being audience to what was being experienced in Europe, resulting from superiority was transformed into grudge due to the defeats in the military field. Due to the decadence experienced in the present, inability to find the solution to the problems of its age, melancholic state of mind because of being stuck in the golden age experienced in the past, in the case of a preference, led to a romantic world view because of the appeal of its simplicity to imitate what was once lived in the past. Thus, it is very natural that the direction of Namık Kemal, the cult personality of Islamist-Turkish thought, is towards the past even when talking about progress and civilization. Seeing the 19th century Europe as a re-implementation of ideas and institutions that are actually Islamic, Namık Kemal, in our opinion, showed us a clear example of a typical Islamist romanticism and an example of occidentalist approach regarding that the West learned the civilization from Muslims. In fact, the exact equivalent of this approach displayed in Turkish cogito without even knowing that it is romantic, emerging in the personality of Namık Kemal and in the feeling of backwardness,with a hectic and injured consciousness, is kitschization. So much so that, the state of being kitsch also explains the current situation of Islamic geography which is far from creating a tradition for at least a century, and it clearly tells the usual romantic end. (shrink)

This paper seeks to make “racism” strange, by exploring its invocation in the sociolinguistic context of LGBTQI+ activism in Greece, where it is used in ways that may be jarring to anglophone readers. In my ongoing research on the conceptualisation of interwoven oppressions in Greek social movement contexts, I have been interested in understanding how the widespread use of the term “racism” as a superordinate category to reference forms of oppression not only based on “race,” “ethnicity,” and “citizenship” (e.g., racism, (...) nationalism, xenophobia) but also those based on gender, gender identity, and sexuality (e.g., sexism, transphobia, and homophobia) relates to the increased adoption of “intersectionality” in movement discourses. In ordinary parlance, this commonplace usage of “racism” as an “umbrella term” nevertheless retains its etymological link to “race,” while its scope is extended to other regimes of superiority/inferiority or privilege/oppression. If intersectionality presupposes that oppressions are ontologically multiple and analytically separable, the use of “racism” as an umbrella concept seems to point in the other direction, implying that all forms of oppression originate from a common source, have a similar ontological basis, or generate privilege for the same social agents, who deploy similar tactics vis-à-vis oppressed groups. My research examines how intersectionality—widely understood as a multi-axial theory of oppression, which contends that power relations are multiple, distinct, and irreducible to one another, yet converge simultaneously in the experiences of multiply oppressed social groups—relates to the use of “racism” as a struggle concept in Greek, but also in other languages commonly used in Greece, such as Albanian (racizmi) and Arabic (eunsuria). In this paper, I examine how these two vocabularies—of racism and intersectionality—are operative in movement discourses, but also how they shape, and are shaped by activists’ perceptions, analyses, and theories of oppression. (shrink)

Judaism was a mythical, strongly tribal religion with anthropomorphic God in which the leading element was the concept of a covenant between God and the exceptional “chosen people.” Such views produced a strong emphasis on tribal unity and attitude of election and moral superiority vis-à-vis the rest of humanity. Philo must have felt inadequacy of the ancient Judaism and its limitations to compete for the minds of Hellenes with their universalistic philosophical thought. Philo represented a trend in Jewish ideology which (...) attempted, in confrontation with the Greek culture, to assert itself as a valid cosmic view to support the existence of a community. He attempted to reevaluate Hebrew ideology found in the scriptures adopting Greek metaphysical, ethical, and religious doctrines to Judaism.The focus of this article is on Philo’s introduction of the Greek concept of Logos, in the modified version of Xenocrates into Judaism. Philo developed this concept further and transformed from a metaphysical entity into an extension of a divine and transcendental anthropomorphic being and mediator between God and men. Thus Philo produced a synthesis of both Hebrew and Greek traditions developing concepts that were used for future Hellenistic interpretation of messianic Hebrew thought by providing foundations for Christianity. (shrink)

If we consider certain features of Spinoza's metaphysics, it can seem very difficult to see how error, or the having of false ideas, is possible. In this paper I want to give the metaphysical background to the problem, before turning to a more detailed consideration of how Spinoza in fact accounts for error, or the having of false ideas. I will show the importance of the notions of adequacy and inadequacy in Spinoza's account. Having done this I will return to (...) the central problem of accounting for the ontological status of false ideas vis a vis both the Infinite Intellect, and finite minds. (shrink)

Historically, there has been great deliberation about the limits of human knowledge. Isaac Newton, recognizing his own shortcomings, once described himself as “a boy standing on the seashore... whilst the great ocean of truth lay all underscored before me.” In _Ignorance,_ Nicholas Rescher presents a broad-ranging study that examines the manifestations, consequences, and occasional benefits of ignorance in areas of philosophy, scientific endeavor, and ordinary life. Citing philosophers, theologians, and scientists from Socrates to Steven Hawking, Rescher seeks to uncover the (...) factors that hinder our cognition. Rescher categorizes ignorance as ontologically grounded, or epistemically grounded. He then defines the basis of ignorance: inaccessible data; statistical fogs; secreted information; past data that have left no trace; future discoveries; future contingencies; vagrant predicates; and superior intelligences. Such impediments set limits to inquiry and mean that while we can always extend our existing knowledge-variability here is infinite-there are things that we will never know. Cognitive finitude also hinders our ability to assimilate more than a certain number of facts. We may acquire additional information, but lack the facility to interpret it. More information does not always increase knowledge; it may point us further down the path toward an erroneous conclusion. In light of these deficiencies, Rescher looks to the role of computers in solving problems and expanding our knowledge base, but finds limits to their reasoning capacity. As Rescher's comprehensive study concludes, ignorance itself is a fertile topic for knowledge, and recognizing the boundaries of our comprehension is where wisdom begins. (shrink)

Tercer i últim volum de les memòries lliures i impertinents d’un dels filòsofs i educadors més influents de Catalunya En els dos primers volums de les seves memòries, el filòsof i pedagog Octavi Fullat s’ha revelat per a molts lectors com un dels intel·lectuals de referència del segle XX català. El seu estil, hereu de la profunda senzillesa d’Albert Camus, combina de manera inconfusible la memòria, l’assaig i la narració. Després de La meva llibertat i La meva veritat , en (...) aquest tercer i últim volum Octavi Fullat ens condueix pels secrets de l’art i la bellesa: l’emoció que pot despertar el cos d’una dona, la conversa a l’entorn d’un diàleg platònic acompanyat amb un bon vi francès o la rememoració d’una màgica nit africana. Per les pàgines d’aquest llibre hi transiten pensadors com Schopenhauer o Hegel, pintors com Van Gogh o Tintoretto, escriptors com Dante o Rilke, músics com Mozart o Beethoven i, com calia esperar, punyents al·lusions al nostre país i als seus polítics. Així, es tanca l’obra més personal d’un home que mai no ha buscat recer i que sempre ha viscut per la llibertat, per la veritat i per la bellesa. Compra La meva bellesa en E-book Web d'Octavi Fullat Octavi Fullat Nascut a Alforja (Baix Camp) el 1928, és doctor en Filosofia per la Universitat de Barcelona i catedràtic de Filosofia de l’Educació de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona des de 1986. Ha rebut diversos premis i, des de 1996, és membre numerari de l’Institut d’Estudis Catalans. Ha estat deixeble de Lévi-Strauss, Michel Foucault i Jean Wahl, i doctor honoris causa a Mèxic i Xile. Ha impartit cursos a diferents universitats d’Europa i Amèrica. Ha estat president del Consell Escolat de Catalunya i del Consell Superior d’Avaluació del Sistema Educatiu de Catalunya. És autor de nombrosos estudis sobre pedagogia, filosofia, ètica, antropologia i història, entre els quals destaquen, La moral atea de Albert Camus (1963), Marx y la religión (1974), Filosofías de la educación (1992), Política de la educación (1994), Antropología y Educación (1997), Els valors d’Occident (2001), El siglo postmoderno (1900-2001) (2002), L’autèntic origen dels europeus (2005), La meva llibertat (2006) i La meva veritat (2008), aquests dos últims publicats per Angle Editorial. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 719 An Apology for Apologetics: A Study in the Logic of lnterreligious Dialogue. By PAUL J. GRIFFITHS. New York: Orbis, 1991. ISBN: 0 88344 761 4. pp. 113. Jesus Christ at the Encounter of World Religions. By J. DUPUIS. New York: Orbis, 1991 (ET: Robert R. Barr, from French, 1989). ISBN: 0 88344 723 1. pp. 301. Griffiths presents a rigorous argument for the possibility of con· (...) tradictory claims between different religious communities. His inspira· tion, as he acknowledges, is William Christian Snr. His basic argu· ment is: " If representative intellectuals belonging to some specific religious community come to judge at a particular time that some or all of their own doctrine-expressing sentences are incompatible with some alien religious claim(s), then they should feel obliged to engage in both positive and negative apologetics vis-a-vis these alien religious claim(s) and their promulgators" (3). He takes negative apologetics to be a critique of arguments made against one's own religious claims, showing that such arguments fail or are inconsistent or incoherent. Positive apologetics shows how a particular religious community's doctrines are cognitively superior, in some respect(s), to another religious community 's doctrines. It is essential for this enterprise that only methods of argumentation and criteria of knowledge acceptable to the adversary are employed. This requires the acceptance of natural theology. Griffiths is well aware of the lion's den he is entering, as his proposals run counter to much scholarship in the area of interreligious dialogue, so he spends three chapters apologetically tackling the lions. The objectors (who mainly remain in notes) include Derrida, Barthes, Winch, Lindbeck, Hick, Huxley, Nasr, Plantinga and others, although Mac· Intyre is curiously missing. This technique has the advantage of isolating and presenting arguments, without falling into problems of cor· rect exegesis of opponents. And this is also its weakness, as objectors will sometimes feel caricatured or misunderstood-as is surely the case with Plantinga and in one instance, Hick. First, he tackles objections that sentences from one tradition are either incomprehensible or incommensurable with those of another, convincingly showing that the strong versions of both claims are self· defeating and unsustainable. Weaker versions still allow for his proj· ect-or so he thinks. This is where Maclntyre's work should have been considered. Then he tackles various theories of religious language (following Lindbeck's typology). He argues against non-cognitive accounts that reduce beliefs to the credibility of causes for holding beliefs, a position incapable of asserting its truth over other views because of its 720 BOOK REVIEWS own presuppositions. He follows Lindbeck in criticizing experiental expressivism, and then turns upon Lindbeck's own form of rule theory (which is ambivalent regarding cognitive claims), arguing convincingly that to suggest that only sentences uttered confessionally and with performative function can possess ontological truth is confused (42). In a brief review it is not possible to rehearse Griffiths's careful argumentation. Griffiths then sets about tackling two types of universalists: Hick and Huxley. Of Hick, he argues that some criteria are required to discern true from false religions (e.g. Jim Jones) and in so doing such a position needs to support and develop such criteria, thereby effectively introducing apologetics. He neglects to deal with Hick's pragmatic criteria of beneficial ' fruits ' evident in adherents, but the logic of his argument can be applied to Hick's proposals. Using Katz and Zaehner, he argues against the esoteric universalism of the philosophia perennis. (The arguments of Robert Forman's recent book, The Problems of Pure Consciousness, are strangely neglected, despite Griffiths's being a contributor to that collection.) Finally, he tackles objections against positive apologetics-first, on the grounds that it has a negative effect on interreligious relations. Logically, this need not be the case, although Griffiths is well aware that the political context of apologetics can obscure its proper goal: deeper critical understanding, learning and problem solving. Then, in sustained dialogue with Plantinga, he argues against the objection that success is impossible. It is impossible only if " knockdown drag-out" (64) argumentative victory is expected. Griffiths suggests the cumulative -case argument and gives instances of such successful apologetics (medieval... (shrink)

This first full-length study of the Arabic reception of Plato's Timaeus considers the role of Galen of Pergamum in shaping medieval perceptions of the text as transgressing disciplinary norms. It argues that Galen appealed to the entangled cosmological scheme of the dialogue, where different relations connect the body, soul, and cosmos, to expand the boundaries of medicine in his pursuit for epistemic authority – the right to define and explain natural reality. Aileen Das situates Galen's work on disciplinary boundaries in (...) the context of medicine's ancient rivalry with philosophy, whose professionals were long seen as superior knowers of the cosmos vis-à-vis doctors. Her case studies show how Galen and four of the most important Christian, Muslim, and Jewish thinkers in the Arabic Middle Ages creatively interpreted key doctrines from the Timaeus to reimagine medicine and philosophy as well as their own intellectual identities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE ORIGINALITY OF ST. THOMAS'S POSITION ON THE PHILOSOPHERS AND CREATION TIMOTHY B. NOONE The Catholic University ofAmerica Washington, D.C. AS IS WELL KNOWN, Thomas Aquinas stands out from his contemporaries in his apparent willingness to defend the possibility of an eternal but created universe, although, like all orthodox Christian believers, he affirmed that the world had a temporal beginning in the light of Scriptural teaching. That Thomas Aquinas (...) defended the possibility of an eternal creation was amply demonstrated over a decade ago by Fr. John Wippel, who pointed to Aquinas's discussion of creation and endless temporal duration in the De aeternitate mundi, a work written in 12 71 or earlier.1 More recently, Professor Mark Johnson wrote an article in which he concluded that, no matter what doctrine the historical Aristotle may have held, St. Thomas consistently attributes a doctrine of creation to Aristotle.2 Most recent of all have come a pair of important studies by Wilks and Macintosh defending the coherence of Thomas's claim that the 1 John F. Wippel, "Did Thomas Aquinas Defend the Possibility of an Eternally Created World? (The De aeternitate mundi Revisited)," The Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1981): 21-37; on the date for Aquinas's De aeternitate mundi, see James A. Weisheipl, "The Date and Context for Aquinas' De aeternitate mundi," in Lloyd P. Gerson, ed., Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens, C.S.S.R., Papers in Medieval Studies, 4 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983), 270. Arguments for an earlier dating can be found in Thomas Bukowski, "An Early Dating for Aquinas' De aeternitate mundi," Gregorianum 51 (1970): 277-303 and more recently, "Understanding St. Thomas on the Eternity of the World: Help from Giles of Rome?" Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 58 (1991): 113-25. The main thesis of this paper is unaffected by the dating of the De aeternitate mundi. 2 Mark F. Johnson, "Did St. Thomas Attribute a Doctrine of Creation to Aristotle?" The New Scholasticism 63 (1989): 129-55. 275 276 TIMOTHY B. NOONE world could be both eternal and created, while another pair of studies by Aersten and van Veldhuijsen have begun to explore from a more historical perspective the importance of Aquinas's formulation of the doctrine of creation for understanding his thought and its distinctiveness.3 The present paper is intended not so much to challenge the conclusions of any of these admirable studies as to put their findings into a wider historical framework through which we may hope to discover what is unique in Aquinas's doctrine of creation. In reading the Scriptum super Sententias of Thomas Aquinas, one is immediately struck by the novelty of Aquinas's claim that the philosophers and thus reason itself may reach the conclusion that the world is created. Such a claim seems quite different from the account of the philosophical knowledge of creation given by several of St. Thomas's immediate predecessors and contemporaries. What, then, emboldens Aquinas to make such a claim? Is Aquinas's reading of the philosophers so original and so superior to that of his contemporaries that he is capable of seeing in the philosophers a doctrine of creation that they missed? Or does Aquinas's originality on the philosophical demonstrability of creation have more to do with a reformulation of the doctrine of creation? Or does Aquinas both have an original interpretation of the philosophers and a different understanding of the doctrine of creation? In an attempt to answer these questions, the present paper will survey early and mid-thirteenth century views on the philosophers and the doctrine of creation and compare those views to Aquinas's position in the Scriptum super Sententias. The thirteenth-century authors included in this survey are chosen for their prominence in thirteenth-century thought, not 3 See Ian Wilks, "Aquinas on the Past Possibility of the World's Having Existed Forever," The Review of Metaphysics 48 (1994): 299-329; J. J. Macintosh, "St. Thomas and the Traversal of the Infinite," The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 68 (1994): 157-77; J. A. Aertsen, "The Eternity of the World: The Believing... (shrink)

This paper, accessible for a general philosophical audience having only some fleeting acquaintance with set-theory and category-theory, concerns the philosophy of mathematics, specifically the bearing of category-theory on the foundations of mathematics. We argue for six claims. (I) A founding theory for category-theory based on the primitive concept of a set or a class is worthwile to pursue. (II) The extant set-theoretical founding theories for category-theory are conceptually flawed. (III) The conceptual distinction between a set and a class can be (...) seen to be formally codified in Ackermann's axiomatisation of set-theory. (IV) A slight but significant deductive extension of Ackermann's theory of sets and classes founds Cantorian set-theory as well as category-theory, and therefore can pass as a founding theory of the whole of mathematics. (V) The extended theory does not suffer from the conceptual flaws of the extant set-theoretical founding theories. (VI) The extended theory is not only conceptually but also logically superior to the competing set-theories because its consistency can be proved on the basis of weaker assumptions than the consistency of the competition. (shrink)